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1.  Introduction 
Europe at a cross-road is a familiar but useful term to describe the current impasse 
the Union finds itself following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. The current 
vein of political and public opinion could take the EU down very different pathways. 
These debates highlight a growing recognition that the EU is evolving rapidly as a 
foreign policy player on the world stage. The EU's original or embryonic brand of 
foreign policy has been neatly coined by observers such as Weiler as "civilian 
diplomacy" i.e. speak softly and carry a big wallet,
1 but this approach is being rapidly 
augmented by a less well-known and more muscular "European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP)".  
 
There is very little in the current Treaties (or even the Constitutional Treaty) to 
explain the rapid development of this muscular element of the EU's foreign policy between 
1999 and 2007. Nor do the Treaties help us explain the sudden growth of military personnel 
pacing the corridors of the Council (and setting up office in Avenue de Cortenbergh). In order 
to understand these major developments (described below) it is more useful to examine 
European security trends of the 1990s and follow the sign-posts of European Council 
conclusions since the introduction of ESDP at the Cologne and Helsinki European 
Councils in 1999.  
 
The speed in the development of ESDP and its undoubted impact on driving forward a 
new more visible EU Foreign Policy raises important questions for both the concerned 
institutions and the citizens of Europe. We often hear that opinion polls show support 
for the further development of EU in external relations, but interpretations of opinion 
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1 The term is attributed to J.H.H. Weiler, during a presentation on "Cyprus: Toward a European 
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  1polls are notoriously selective. For example, a recent Eurobarometer opinion poll 
shows positive responses to the impact of enlargement on contributing to peace and 
security amongst EU Member States.
2 It also shows a positive view amongst the 
respondents on the view that more decision-making should take place at the EU level on 
promoting peace and democracy in the world.
3 Eurobaromter states that amongst the policy 
areas where citizens feel the EU could improve even more "...are areas where the European 
Union’s performance is judged positively. They concern cooperation in research and 
innovation, equal treatment between men and women, the promotion of democracy and peace 
in the world."
4 This paper is not a textual analysis of opinion polls, but an interesting question 
comes forward: do such opinions show support for the original EU approach to CFSP ie 
speaking softly and carrying a big wallet, or are they also endorsing the developments since 
1999 of the more muscular ESDP?  
 
The authors of this paper do not need to be convinced of the added-value ESDP is 
playing today and will undoubtedly play in the future. Nor do they need to be 
convinced that ESDP is an important new "instrument" in the foreign policy "toolbox" 
to respond to the demands of the contemporary security environment or to avoid the 
inaction and hesitancy of the past. However, the authors put forward a number of 
issues in this paper that should be discussed more widely if the development of ESDP 
is to be a real added value for the pursuit of the Union's CFSP and sustainable in the 
face of future external crises and internal political debate. In this respect the authors 
argue for the need to address the so-called double-democratic deficit where there is a 
need for improved transparency, debate and democratic scrutiny of ESDP, which will 
otherwise remain in the shadow of the constitution.   
 
Advances in the Constitutional Treaty in the area of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) include the creation of a Foreign Minister and the prospect of 
greater coherence in external relations. The Treaty's rejection by French and Dutch 
citizens in referenda has paradoxically not slowed the rise of the EU in external 
relations as witnessed by negotiations with Iran and the 9 ongoing European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) crisis management operations around the world.
5 The 
EU’s international profile on security matters has continued to grow, in particular 
since the introduction of ESDP in 1999, and has led to calls for institutional reforms. 
However, partly in respect of French and Dutch constituencies, such reforms have so-
far stopped short of declaring a new Foreign Minister or External Action Service. The 
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  2current debate, therefore, focuses upon how to make the new external relations 
“instruments” under the two pillars (Community pillar I and CFSP pillar II) work 
more coherently with each other and with the Member States (in particular their 
military instruments). This emphasis upon “coherence of external resources” (EU and 
national) places a greater demand upon the Member States and the European 
institutions to coordinate more closely. This trend also leads to a greater role for the 
European Parliament that is more demanding than has been seen to-date in this policy 
area and one that has not been widely discussed in academic and some policy-making 
circles. This article will explore the implications of these policy trends for the future 
external role of the Union and in particular the implications for the European 
Parliament.   
 
The paper introduces the key arguments and paradoxes inherent in moving forward on 
CFSP and ESDP within the existing treaties and in the absence of an agreement on the 
innovations (such as a Foreign Minister) introduced by the Constitutional Treaty. In 
particular, it looks at the role of ESDP which is widely recognised as a new driver of 
the EU’s external relations. It will then demonstrate how proposals in the 
Constitutional Treaty have focussed in particular on political and institutional 
improvements in CFSP rather than on the area of defence which partly explains why it 
has been easier for the Member States to move ahead on ESDP using the current 
Treaties. Nevertheless, the paper argues that this twin-speed "bottom-up or technical" 
development of ESDP without the “political upgrading” of CFSP (through the 
proposed Foreign Minister and External Action Service) risks continuing incoherence 
and inconsistency of CFSP and further confusion in the public sphere on critical 
questions of leadership, representation and responsibility for the EU’s external 
actions.  
 
Importantly, this trend also raises questions for the European Parliament to address. 
For instance MEP Graham Watson speaking in the plenary debate of the European 
Parliament on the decision by EU Member States to contribute forces to the UN force 
(UNIFIL) to end the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in the summer of 2006, stated: 
"...The Union does not have the European constitution that it needs and which would 
have equipped it far better to deal with this situation. We are deploying European 
forces but this is not an EU force…In terms of democratic decision-making we are 
running on a wing and a prayer. ...Mr Solana said that this was the most important 
decision taken by the EU for many years….[But when Mr Solana was asked about the 
details of the operation we were told that it was] … ‘a matter strictly between the 
United Nations and the troop contributors’. We were told, therefore, that this was not 
a European matter. The danger is this: the European public at large believe that 
Europe has responded to the crisis. If things go wrong and we have large numbers of 
young men coming back home in body bags, people will want to know who in Europe 
is responsible. Somebody will have to take the political responsibility."
6
The paper concludes by highlighting the key issues, and offering some innovative 
ideas, that are being debated by the European Parliament on the continued 
development of CFSP in the absence of an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty 
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  3and the potential and real problems this causes for meeting the expectations of public 
and parliamentary scrutiny. It is a modest contribution to a complex and fundamental 
debate at the heart of the future of Europe.  
2.  Framing CFSP/ESDP 
2.1 From the European Defence Community to the Amsterdam Treaty 
It was not until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty that defence made its way back into the 
EU after the rejection by the French Assemblée Nationale of the European Defence 
Community in 1954. For some, this gave the EU a strong civilian power identity 
although this view perhaps over-simplified the full political landscape in Europe 
where the development of the European Economic Community and then the European 
Union occurred alongside the development of a military alliance in NATO.
7 Whether 
one supports the civilian power thesis or not, few would disagree that the origins of 
the Union are rooted in a “peace project” to ensure that the wars of the twentieth 
century amongst Europe’s member states would never again destroy the lives of 
generations of European citizens.
8 With increased political cooperation (leading to the 
Single European Act), the end of the Cold War and unification of Germany, and the 
agreement on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the “peace project” became a central part 
of Europe’s foreign policy and codified in Title V of the Treaty on European Union 
whereby:  
"The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy 
covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: 
  to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, 
  to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, 
  to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on 
external borders, 
  to promote international cooperation, 
  to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms."
9 
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  4The text of the current Treaties provide a wide basis for the continued development of 
CFSP and ESDP. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established the CFSP with its broad 
objectives that in principle included “the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.” Although the Union would 
request the WEU “which is an integral part of the development of the Union” to 
implement any defence decisions.  
 
However, the Union’s foreign policy was still in its infancy and these broad objectives 
were soon to be exposed by the tragedy of the Balkan Wars. During this time 
divisions between Member States impeded common action and diplomatic and 
economic pressure alone proved insufficient. Despite criticisms levelled at the EU the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty introduced important innovations, not least the position of 
High Representative. Defence ambitions remained although expressed in a slightly 
modified language including “the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy…which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so 
decide.” Proposals for the submersion of the WEU into the EU were laid out (and 
eventually implemented in 2000) and the so-called “Petersberg tasks” were adopted.
10
 
The introduction of the High Representative at Amsterdam, seemed to signify an 
incremental change with the position restricted to supporting the Presidency and 
implementing decisions of the Council of Ministers. However, once more events in 
the EU’s neighbourhood, specifically the 1998-1999 Kosovo crisis, were highlighting 
European weaknesses to respond as well as their inability to influence the military 
intervention of the United States, which persuaded the Member States that they 
needed to be more ambitious. This resulted in the appointment of a high-profile HR, 
Javier Solana, a former Spanish Foreign Minister and NATO Secretary General, and 
in the December 1998 bilateral Franco-British Summit at St Malo which called for the 
EU to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond 
to international crises.” This breakthrough represented a shift in UK attitude to the 
development of defence within the framework of the EU and, during the June 1999 
Cologne European Council it also marked the arrival of ESDP as a new driver in the 
development of the CFSP.
11
2.2 From Cologne to Iraq 
Between 1999 and 2003 ESDP developed at a hot pace concentrating initially on 
structures for decision making and upon defence capability development.  The HR 
would now be supported in his activities by a Policy Unit and a Joint Situation Centre, 
whereas decision-making would be based around the Member States, at the level of 
Ambassadorial representatives, in a new Political and Security Committee (made 
permanent by the 2001 Nice Treaty) mandated to provide overall political and 
strategic guidance for European Council decisions. The Political and Security 
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policy-making which has caused some tensions along the way with COREPER.
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Organigramme Council General Secretariat ESDP structures in support of the Political and Security 
Committee, EU Military Committee and Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Source 
European Security and Defence College-HLC. 
 
The initial focus upon the creation of decision-making structures was also combined 
with a focus upon the development of defence capabilities as described at the 1999 
Helsinki European Council and its famous Helsinki Headline Goal commitment to 
“be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military 
forces of up to 50,000–60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.”
13 
When it became clear that the Member States could not achieve this target due to 
capability shortfalls, a process was established that would become a mainstay of 
ESDP discussions on cataloguing European capabilities (Headline Goal Catalogue), 
analysing commitments to the Headline Goal (Headline Commitments Catalogue) and 
measuring progress to achieve capability shortfalls (Headline Progress Catalogue). 
The analysis carried out by the EU Military Staff on these catalogues reinforced the 
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  6conclusion, arrived at previously in NATO, that despite having some 2 million men 
and women under arms and spending annually approximately €2 billion on defence,
14 
European member states had key capability shortfalls especially in the enabling areas 
of “force projection” (i.e. strategic and tactical air and sea lift, sustainability and 
logistics, and command and control). A further step was therefore established that 
would, following the process to elaborate the Constitutional  Treaty, lead to the 
creation of a European Defence Agency to help the process of post-Cold War defence 
“transformation” in Europe and to address such key capability shortfalls.
15 However, 
before a European Defence Agency could be established, ESDP gained a new boost 
from a surprising source: the Iraq war.  
2.3 The European Security Strategy 
Less than 4 years after the 1999 Cologne European Council, CFSP/ESDP and the 
European Union more broadly was facing a serious crisis generated by the war in Iraq 
and the appearance of deepening divisions in intra-EU as well as Transatlantic 
relations.  In order to help overcome serious divisions within the EU, Javier Solana 
was tasked at the informal foreign ministers (known as a “Gymnich”) meeting in 
spring 2003 with developing a common European Security Strategy (ESS). The 
process to develop an ESS was, at the time, considered to be as important as the final 
outcome and represented perhaps the most ambitious effort by Solana’s team in the 
Policy Unit of the Council General Secretariat to consult and to develop a consensus 
on the first European security strategy document. Interestingly such a process had 
taken place before in NATO and the WEU but never within the EU. Furthermore it 
unfolded in a climate of suspicion and unrest amongst political leaders and their 
populations. The process to develop an ESS therefore included elaborate consultations 
with Member States and with a wider, predominantly think-tank and research, 
community through specific seminars (in Rome, Paris, Stockholm and Brussels). The 
Parliamentary dimension was not particularly visible but separate meetings were 
taking place with the European Parliament and in particular through the Convention 
Working Group on defence and external relations which would ultimately lead to the 
adoption of the Constitutional Treaty.
16  
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  7The ESS was adopted by consensus at the European Council in December 2003.
17 It 
was immediately celebrated as a distinctly “European” document emphasising 
“effective multilateralism” and the “rule of law” in particular based upon the UN 
system. This stood in stark contrast to the 2003 US National Security Strategy and its 
association with “unilateralism” that was seen as the bed-rock of the US strategy for 
war with Iraq and the cause of so much division within Europe. The ESS was not only 
a reaction to the US, it also set out clear ambitions for the Union to raise its game as a 
global economic power and assume responsibilities in responding to “key threats and 
challenges”. The latter were described as international terrorism, non-proliferation 
regional security, organised crime and failed states as well as an ambition to be more 
active, coherent and capable. The initial ESDP focus upon developing defence 
capabilities stimulated a reappraisal on the need to do more on civilian capabilities 
and the broader EU instruments in the area of development, humanitarian aid and the 
promotion of economic stability. Coherence, a key concern for many years was also 
highlighted as a central theme of the new European Security Strategy which would 
require more policy coordination because: 
 
"The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: 
European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and 
civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have 
an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition 
for development."
18
 
In short the strategy was well received and reminded Europeans that, despite the 
radical disruption caused by the Iraq War, they had a common understanding and 
approach to key security issues and a common institutional framework within which 
to pursue them. Therefore, attention then turned to making ESDP operational.  
2.4 The early ESDP Operations 
Reality on the ground provided the first indication of the type of concrete operations 
the EU might conduct under ESDP. Whilst the majority of ESDP operations have 
been civilian the largest and most demanding to-date have been military operations. 
These have also served the basis for some of the most developed lessons learned (at 
the UN and national level) which in turn have led to new conceptual developments. 
Below we will first introduce some of the ESDP operations and then look in more 
detail at the civilian and military interplay of capabilities in relation to the DRC.  
 
Figure 2: past and present ESDP Operations (Source: www.europa.eu) 
  
Ongoing Operations  Date and Description 
Western Balkans   
EU Military Operation in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)  
The Council of the European Union decided on 12 July to 
conduct a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).  
                                                 
17 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 2003 at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/78364.pdf
Solana, J. "A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy", Brussels, 12 December 
2003 at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
18 Ibid.  
  8EU Police Mission in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (EUPM)  
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) started on 1 January 2003. It followed on 
from the UN's International Police Task Force. 
EU Planning team (EUPT) in 
Kosovo  
The Council decided on 10 April to establish an EU planning 
team regarding a possible future EU crisis management 
operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas. 
Middle East   
EU Police Mission in the Palestinian 
Territories (EUPOL COPPS) 
On 14 November 2005, the Council established an EU Police 
Mission in the Palestinian Territories. The operational 
phase  started on 1  January  2006 and will have an initial 
duration of 3 years.  
EU Border Assistance Mission at 
Rafah Crossing Point in the 
Palestinian Territories (EU BAM 
Rafah) 
On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
concluded an "Agreement on Movement and Access", 
including agreed principles for Rafah crossing (Gaza). On 
21 November 2005, the Council of the EU agreed that the EU 
should undertake the Third Party role proposed in the 
Agreement.  
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission 
for Iraq (Eujust Lex)  
Following an invitation from the Iraqi Transitional 
Government, the EU Council has decided on 21 February 2005 
to launch an integrated rule-of-law mission for Iraq. 
Africa   
EU Police Mission in Kinshasa 
(DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa)   
In April 2005, the EU, in close coordination with the United 
Nations, launched a police mission in Kinshasa (DRC).  
EU security sector reform mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)   
Following an official request by the DRC government, the EU 
decided to establish an EU advisory and assistance mission for 
security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). 
EU  Support  to  AMIS  II  (Darfur)      In response to the request of the African Union (AU), the 
European Union established on 18 July 2005 an EU civilian-
military supporting action to AMIS II. 
Completed operations   
Western Balkans   
EU Police Advisory Team in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (EUPAT)   
On 15 December 2003, the EU launched an EU police advisory 
team (EUPAT) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
EU Military Operation in former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(Concordia)   
The European Union launched a military operation in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) on 
31 March 2003. 
EU Police Mission in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(Proxima)   
On 15 December 2003, the European Union established an EU 
Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
South Caucasus   
EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia 
(Eujust Themis)  
The European Union (EU) launched on 16 July 2004 an EU 
Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS) 
Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)    The European Union, together with contributing countries from 
ASEAN, as well as with Norway and Switzerland, deployed a 
mission to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement 
in Aceh (Indonesia).  
Africa   
EUFOR RD Congo    The EU launched a military operation in support of the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC) during the election process. 
EU Military Operation in 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Artemis) 
On 5 June 2003 the Council adopted a Joint Action for the 
operation, code-named ARTEMIS, that was intended to 
contribute to achieving a safe and secure environment in Bunia. 
 
 
 
  9 
2.4.1 Operation Concordia  
On 31 March 2003 the EU launched its first EU Military Operation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUFOR Concordia). European Union forces took 
over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony with the aim of contributing further to 
a stable, secure environment in FYROM and ensuring the implementation of the 
August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which settled the conflict between 
Macedonian Slavs and Albanians. The EU force patrolled the ethnic Albanian-
populated regions of FYROM that border Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
The operation, requested by FYROM and endorsed by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1371,
19 was conducted by personnel from 13 EU member states (all MS 
other than Denmark and Ireland) and 14 non-member states.
20 The total forces were a 
modest 400 lightly armed military personnel, and the budget for the first six months 
of the operation was €6.2 million. The EU drew on NATO assets and capabilities 
under the Berlin Plus arrangements, thus providing the first test case for the strategic 
EU–NATO partnership for crisis management embodied in the agreement of 
December 2002.
21
2.4.2 Operation Artemis 
The EU’s second military operation, Operation Artemis, highlighted a second 
operational concept available to the Union, that of the ‘framework nation’. The aim of 
Operation Artemis was to prevent a large-scale humanitarian and civil crisis in Ituri, a 
region in the north-east of the DRC. The EU responded to an appeal by the UN 
Secretary-General and launched a military operation on 12  June 2003, under a 
mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1484.
22 Operation Artemis sought 
to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the 
humanitarian situation in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, with a force of about 1800 
soldiers, mostly French, under the Operational Command of Major General Neveux. 
Artemis was the EU’s first military operation outside Europe as well as the first not to 
rely on NATO assistance. 
 
Operation Artemis showed that the ‘framework nation’ concept, initially elaborated 
within the Western European Union, can be useful for achieving some semblance of 
‘rapidity’ in an EU multinational operation. Certain member states have the necessary 
structures to lead rapid response operations, and in a Union of 25 (now 27) members 
it will not always be possible to include every member in every operation, as was 
                                                 
19 UN Security Council Resolution 1371, 26 Sep. 2001, URL <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>. 
20 Denmark does not take part in EU actions which have defence implications due to its opt-out under 
Article 6 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union. 
Ireland's participation was blocked by a legal intervention questioning whether a new UN Security 
Council mandate was necessary for the EU operation.  
21 NATO, ‘EU–NATO declaration on ESDP’, Press release (2002)142, 16 Dec. 2002, URL 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/>. 
22 UN Security Council Resolution 1484, 30 May 2003, URL <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>. 
  10attempted with EUFOR Concordia.
23 It was also a clear indication of the EU’s 
approach to effective multilateralism, made explicit later that year in the European 
Security Strategy Reform, as it was set up at the request of the UN Secretary-General 
and was intended to support MONUC whilst the UN Mission was strengthened and 
re-deployed. Finally, by operating with a chapter VII mandate under the UN Charter, 
it showed the way for a more muscular UN force in the DRC. 
2.4.3 EUFOR Althea 
A third EU military operation, EUFOR Althea, took over from NATO’s Stabilization 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) on 2 December 2004. This operation also 
drew upon the “Berlin Plus” arrangements agreed with NATO. It was (and remains) 
the largest ESDP operation of its kind with approximately 7000 troops. The model is 
also interesting because the operation is being closely associated with the 
Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina and is being tabled by the EU as 
an innovative approach to improving civil–military coordination in the field 
(specifically, with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which as - the 
first ESDP operation - has been running a police operation since January 2003).
24
 
These early experiences as well as those from the wider international community (UN 
and Member States) are bringing to the fore new concepts for intervening in complex 
civil conflicts/crises (from humanitarian relief to stabilisation and peacebuilding 
missions). In particular such concepts and lessons learned emphasise “comprehensive 
planning” and civil-military planning and coordination which responds to both a need 
to improve EU inter-institutional coherence and improving effectiveness of external 
action in the field. For the EU this has highlighted a need to bring ESDP (pillar II) and 
Member State capabilities together with the Community’s (pillar I) short-term 
humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction assistance and its longer-term 
stabilisation and development aid. A recent example of the potential for the EU to 
draw upon capabilities from across the range of ESDP (civilian and military), 
Member State and Community instruments was highlighted by its role in supporting 
transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  
2.4.4 DRC – Civil-Military Coordination 
On 27 April 2006 the EU adopted a Joint Action which established a legal basis for an 
EU ESDP Military Operation, known as EUFOR R.D. Congo to run from August to 
November the same year. The operation was widely anticipated after the UN (Under 
Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations) invited the European Union on 
December 27th 2005 to consider providing support to strengthen the United Nations 
Peace keeping Operation in the DRC (MONUC) during that country's first elections 
                                                 
23 Quille & Missiroli. op cit. 
24 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 17 and 18 June 2004at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf. For a critical analysis see Keane, R. 'EUFOR Mission for 
Bosnia by the end of 2004', ESR, No 23 2004.  
  11for 40 years. The mission was an autonomous ESDP operation with Germany acting 
as Framework Nation and providing the Operational Headquarters at Potsdam.
25  
 
The EU had been working for some time in support of peace processes in the Great 
Lakes region. This has included political (not least represented by the appointment of 
an EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes), economic and development 
support and the already mentioned operation Artemis.  
 
More immediately the EU has invested substantially in the election process. Over half 
of the funding for the elections comes from EU resources. This includes an additional 
60 million in November 2005 towards the support programme for electoral reform on 
top of the 89 million allocated in 2004. This is the largest ever Community 
contribution to an electoral process. The election was further supported by an EU 
Election Observation Mission headed by MEP General Morillon and reinforced by a 
European Parliament short term observation mission.   
 
Further support to transition and specifically to the electoral process has been 
provided for by the launch of an ESDP Police Mission known as EUPOL Kinshasa.
26 
It was the first ESDP EU civilian (police) mission in Africa. In December 2004, the 
PSC decided that EUPOL Kinshasa should pursue a three-fold approach to assist with 
the rehabilitation and refurbishment of a training centre and the provision of basic 
equipment; to assist with the training of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU); and to 
follow-up, monitor, and oversee the implementation of the IPU's mandate after the 
initial training phase. Furthermore, on 8 June 2005 (for an initial 12 month period, 
subsequently extended) the EU also launched a Security Sector Reform Mission in the 
DRC known as EUSEC DRC. The main objective of EUSEC DRC is to provide 
advice and assistance on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and in particular to contribute 
to a successful integration of a united Congolese army.
27
  
Whilst Europe's interests stem from its colonial past, it has evolved into one based on 
significant political dialogue, trade flows as well as aid. The EU is the biggest donor 
in Africa accounting for 60% of all official ODA.  
 
The recently adopted EU Africa Strategy reminds us of the EU instruments and policy 
frameworks that have been developed for engaging with Africa, namely the recently 
revised Cotonou Agreement (dating from the original 1963 Yaoundé agreement and 
then the Lomé I Agreement signed in 1975 and further developed up to Lomé V for 
sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific countries), the Trade Development and 
Cooperation Agreement (with South-Africa), the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and 
                                                 
25 The financial Framework identified in the Joint Action is 16.7 million for "common costs" to be 
managed by the ATHENA Mechanism. This is in addition to costs borne directly by Member (and 
contributing 3rd) States a practice known as "costs lie where they fall".  
26 Martinelli, M. Helping transition: the EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(EUPOL Kinshasa) in the framework of EU policies in the Great Lakes. European Foreign Affairs 
Review, 11(3), Autumn 2006, pp. 379-400. 
27 Ibid. See also: Martinelli, M. "Les initiatives européennes de reforme du secteur de sécurité en 
République démocratique du Congo." In : Bernard, A. (ed) "Europe Puissance Tranquille ? Rôle et 
identité sur la scène mondiale."  Grip, Bruxelles, 2006, pp. 148-157 ; et Martinelli, M. "Implementing 
the ESDP in Africa: the Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo." In: Merlingen, M. and 
Ostrauskaite, R. (eds) "The European Security and Defence Policy: Operationalisation, Impact and 
Context", Routledge, forthcoming, 2007. 
  12the European Neighbourhood Policy (for North African countries).
28 The EU Africa 
Strategy also complements key EU security reference documents, namely the 
European Security Strategy, that highlight a desire by the Union to balance security 
and development interests whereby peace and security are the first prerequisites to 
sustainable development.  
 
European interests in Africa are by no means altruistic; they reflect long standing 
economic, developmental and security interests in the region.
29 All these economic, 
developmental and political actions serve to underpin the EU's longer-term role in 
supporting the DRC to transition and helping to build a stable regional actor. The EU 
has, therefore, wider interests than the colonial legacies of predominantly France, UK 
and Belgium (and more distant relationships of Germany with DRC's neighbours in 
Rwanda and Burundi) that represent immediate security, economic and political 
interests of Europe today. Collectively, these factors provide important additional 
information for understanding the EU's current support to the DRC during the election 
period. 
2.4.5 Limits of ESDP?  
The reality of operational demands has somewhat marginalised previous rhetorical 
questions, such as what the ESDP was for and where it might be used. While they 
illustrate the EU’s strategic ambitions, both in its neighbourhood and in sub-Saharan 
Africa, there is no ground for complacency about a multiplication of these actions 
because the capability-building process underpinning the operations remains a much 
longer-term effort. Ongoing conflicts in such places as Darfur, Sudan, and the 
reactions of different European states to recent operational demands in Afghanistan 
and Iraq have provided reminders of the political and material limits to collective 
European action. Nevertheless with preparations ongoing to take over from the UN in 
Kosovo in what promises to be the largest, and potentially most demanding, ESDP 
civilian police mission of its kind, there is every reason to believe that the current 
trend, which has led to 16 complete or ongoing ESDP operations in less than 5 years, 
will continue.   
 
Since the development of ESDP within the EU from the 1999 Cologne European 
Council, the Member States have developed the decision-making and institutional 
support structures to enable them to use the EU as a “framework” for pursuing their 
                                                 
28 Communication from the Commission on 12 October 2005 entitled an 'EU Strategy for Africa: 
Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa's Development', page 2. Can be found at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/communications/docs/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_200
5_en.pdf 
29 Such interests include, not least as a trading partner rich in mineral resources (including copper, 
cobalt, zinc, manganese, uranium, diamonds, coal, gold, silver and, particularly important, coltan)  and 
there are also major deposits of offshore petroleum near the mouth of the Congo River; to see a 
positive return on large sums of development assistance (such as 750 million euro between 2003-
2007); to see a positive return on international financial assistance, for example in June 2002, the IMF 
approved a three-year US$ 750 billions PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) and the Paris 
Club of donors pledged a further US$ 5.7bn  for the period 2005-2007; to avoid large scale 
humanitarian crisis which might result in the need to deploy substantial numbers of troops, as well as 
increased sums of humanitarian and development assistance; to avoid large scale population movement 
which in turn will increase regional instability and lead to increased immigration at the borders of 
Europe. 
  13national and combined defence and security ambitions.
30 They have been careful to 
maintain their inter-governmental control over the development of ESDP by limiting 
the financial resources (embedded in article 28 of the Treaty on European Union) 
available through the CFSP budget and by providing military resources on the basis of 
national contributions-only (i.e. no EU military budget for defence operations and no 
European army).
31 Together with these inter-governmental tendencies, lessons 
learned have inspired institutional arrangements to support the concepts of 
coordination and planning such as a new EU Civil Military Planning Cell, established 
between 2005 and 2006, and an EU level Operations Centre from January 2007. 
Finally new operational capabilities have been developed, notably the so-called 
Battlegroups with two on stand-by for deployment from January 2007, a development 
which even led one commentator to state "The European Union has quietly acquired 
what might be described as a standing army".
32  
 
Improving the coherence of EU external action is a welcome objective but its pursuit 
also creates a new level of complexity in EU planning between civil and military 
actors and across Community and inter-governmental pillars. The European Security 
Strategy’s emphasis upon coherence across the spectrum of ESDP and Community 
capabilities were also being developed within the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, which was also addressing more fundamentally the institutional arrangements 
needed to underpin the growing international presence of the EU on the world stage.
33  
The Convention on the Future of Europe and the Constitutional Treaty  
3.1 Key Foreign Policy innovations  
They developments in the Constitutional Treaty in the area of Foreign Affairs refer to 
the creation of the new post of Foreign Minister and a joined up External Action 
Service (which would overcome the existing pillar structure). The final report of the 
Convention's Working Group, chaired by Jean Luc Dehaene, on "External Action" 
reflected a “large trend” in favour of setting up a double-hatted “External 
Representative” (ER), combing the functions of Solana and Commissioner Patten.
34 
The job description submitted by the Working Group was translated into the new draft 
Constitutional Treaty with very little adjustment. It is important to appreciate that the 
Convention formula does not amount to a merger of two positions into one, instead it 
attributes to one and the same person the exercise of two functions, (i.e. a personal 
union).
35
 
                                                 
30 Cameron , F. "ESDP: the state of play", EPC Working Paper No. 11, September 2004 
31 See footnote 9.  
32  Reynolds, P. "New force behind EU foreign policy", BBC Web-site at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6441417.stm. On the Battlegroups see: Quille, G. "The EU 
Battlegroups", Policy Department, Directorate General External Policies, European Parliament, 12 
September 2006. Lindstrom, G. "EU Battlegroups", EU-Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 
2007.  
33 Grevi, G. et al " The EU Foreign Minister: Beyond Double-hatting", International Spectator, Vol XL, 
No. 1, March 2005 
34 See CONV 459/02 
35 Grevi et al, op cit. 
  14The Constitutional Treaty sets out a job description for the Foreign Minister. Article 
I-28 of the Constitutional Treaty states:  
•  that the FM is to be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission (Article I-
28.1); 
•  in such a role he/she will (Article I-28.3) preside over the Foreign Affairs 
Council: 
•  he/she will also be one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission and as such 
be "bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent" with 
this article.  
 
Whilst the Convention on the Future of Europe provided a new focus for European 
and Transatlantic discussions on the future of the EU and NATO, this soon settled 
into an older pattern of dispute and compromise between the US, UK and France, 
with input from Italy as the holder of the EU Presidency. The final agreement on 
contentious defence issues - such as that of an autonomous EU capability for 
Operational Planning - was reached by the UK and France and made public at their 
bi-lateral summit meeting on 24 November 2003, which stated: ‘The UK and France 
will continue our co-operation in the field of capability development. The ultimate 
test of the success of the EU’s crisis management capacity is that it is able to prepare 
for, launch and conduct effective and coherent operations’.
36 While no specific 
reference was made to ‘an autonomous planning cell’ an accent was placed on the 
planning, capabilities and conduct of operations. This opened the way for a ‘defence 
deal’ at the 2003 Inter-governmental Conference (IGC).  
3.2 Key defence innovations 
The articles in the Constitutional Treaty covering defence include a commitment to 
the progressive framing of a common defence policy and this could lead to a common 
defence “when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides”. The most 
important change, however, is the acceptance of a new form of “permanent structured 
cooperation” (articles I-41 para 6 and III-312) within the Union that would allow 
those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have 
made more binding commitments to one another in this area, to carry out missions on 
behalf of the EU.  
 
Article 1 of Protocol 23 of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) states that permanent 
structured cooperation shall be open to any Member State:  
•  That undertakes to proceed more intensively to develop its defence 
capacities through the development of its national contributions and 
participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main 
European equipment programmes, and in the European Defence Agency. 
•  That has the capacity to supply, by 2007 at the latest, targeted combat 
units for the missions planned… with support elements including transport 
and logistics. 
 
                                                 
36 Franco-British Summit, London, 24 November 2004 at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/UKFrance_DefenceDeclaration,0.pdf
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permanent structured cooperation shall: 
•  Cooperate to achieve approved objectives concerning the level of 
expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives 
in the light of the security environment and of the Union’s international 
responsibilities. 
•  Bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, 
particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by 
pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and 
capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and 
logistics. 
•  Take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, 
flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying 
common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including 
possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures. 
•  Work together to make good the shortfalls perceived in the framework of 
the “Capability Development Mechanism”.  
•  Take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or 
European equipment programmes in the framework of the Agency. 
 
Article 3 refers to the EDA and states that it shall contribute to the regular assessment 
of Member States’ contributions in relation to capabilities (article III-312 para 3 and 
4). There are also complicated proposals for the use of qualified majority voting 
(QMV) in taking decisions under permanent structured cooperation but experience 
suggests that Member States would be very reluctant to break from the traditional 
principle of unanimity in defence matters. Another change is the mutual solidarity 
clause, which acknowledges the commitments of NATO Members States that “if a 
Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member 
States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their 
power...” (article I-41 para 7). Although this is more a political gesture than an 
attempt to create an EU defence alliance, it does serve to underline the basic 
solidarity between Member States. 
 
The proposals for a Foreign Minister and External Actions service are under review as 
the Member States discuss their next steps after the French and Dutch referenda. As 
an important political symbol, as well as widely regarded innovations to help improve 
the coherence and effectiveness of European external action, the appointment of an 
EU Foreign Minister with an external actions service has not been implemented. This 
stands in stark contrast to the defence aspects of the Constitutional Treaty. All the 
defence proposals have further developed and operationalised including the European 
Defence Agency and the solidarity clause.
37 Whilst permanent structured cooperation 
                                                 
37 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ 
L245/17, 17 July 2004, at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_245/l_24520040717en00170028.pdf. European Council, 
Presidency Concluions, 25 and 26 March 2004 adopted a Declaration on Terrorism which included the 
incorporation of "the spirit of the Solidarity Clause contained in Article 42 of the draft Constitution for 
Europe". The declaration came into force on 1 May 2004 and can be found at:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/79635.pdf
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in the form of the Battlegroups.  These proposals on the defence aspects of the ESDP 
are being implemented as practical incremental steps whereas the highly political 
upgrading of the Union with a Foreign Minister is being kept under review for the 
time being. Whilst this may signify a certain respect for French and Dutch voters, it 
also ensures the ESDP motor continues to drive the Union forward with a greater 
number of ESDP missions and CFSP commitments.  
3.3 Implications for the European Parliament 
Whilst distinct challenges still remain to overcome the democratic deficit in CFSP and 
in particular the military aspects of ESDP, the draft Constitution provides a foothold 
for engaging more meaningfully with the decision-making process.  The Parliament 
will play a formal role in endorsing the candidature of the Vice-President of the 
Commission, i.e. the Foreign Minister. The European Parliament is also consulted on 
important decision in relation to the establishment of the External Action Service and 
any new procedures for pre-financing CFSP actions. This is in addition to the 
strengthened consultation role it has negotiated within the framework of the new 
Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 (and the associated Inter-institutional Agreement 
between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary 
discipline and sound financial management).
38 The Parliament's report on the 
Constitution (2004) welcomed what "will be a significant enhancement of the Union's 
visibility and capacity as a global actor" with the Foreign Minister and single 
External Actions Service.
39   
 
The position of FM not only provides an opportunity for greater formal Parliamentary 
scrutiny as a Vice-President of the Commission, but the breaking-down of the pillars 
represented by the proposal for a united External Action Service (EAS) will also 
strengthen the current trend toward more “joined up” use of external instruments 
(namely under the CFSP budget, Stability Instrument, Development Cooperation 
Instrument, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, the Pre-Accession 
Instrument, and the Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights) 
over which the EP has important budgetary scrutiny as well as powers of co-
decision.
40  
 
Although there is still a long way to go in improving parliamentary scrutiny at the EU 
level, the developments introduced in the Constitutional Treaty in the form of the FM 
and EAS will also lead to a de facto significant increase in the European Parliament’s 
powers of scrutiny and budgetary decision-making. In the absence of the 
Constitutional Treaty, the EP maintains a scrutiny role over CFSP and it 
incrementally improves its budgetary powers (such as through in the above mentioned 
                                                 
38 Official Journal of the European Union C 139/1, Inter-institutional Agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management, 
14.6.2006  
39 European Parliament resolution on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004/2129 
(INI))of 12 January 2005, para. 3, OJ C247 E, 6 October 2005, pp. 88 at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/ce247/ce24720051006en00880093.pdf
40 There is also a Nuclear Safety and Security Instrument and a financing Instrument for Cooperation 
with Industrialised countries and territories and other high-income countries and territories (ICI), which 
along with the Pre-Accession Instrument merely foresee consultation with the European Parliament.  
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authority over the current High Representative for CFSP. This may seem a small 
detail but just look at the recent controversy over the role of the EU member states in 
the so-called extraordinary rendition by the CIA of suspects in the war on terrorism 
and the damaging political fallout from the lack of cooperation from some Member 
States and in particular from the lack of cooperation from the High Representative to 
the European Parliament. This has left both a negative image of the EU and its High 
Representative. Here there are lessons for any future Foreign Minister, who would 
need to be more cooperative and responsive to the European Parliament or risk 
bringing down the whole college of the Commission.
41  
3.4 The rejection of the Treaty - the end of CFSP? 
The world has not stopped with the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in French 
and Dutch referenda, nor has it paused for reflection to join intra-European debates on 
the cost of non-Europe in foreign affairs following this rejection. Whilst the EU’s 
member states, institutions and citizens have embraced a debate on the future of the 
treaty, they have not become introverted “navel gazers” but have remained active on 
the world stage in responding to and taking part in some of the most serious and 
complex foreign policy issues of the day. This has ranged from playing a central role 
in the resolution of last summer’s war between Israel and Lebanon, to its role in the 
future status of Kosovo, to the stable transition of the DRC, to an increased ESDP role 
alongside its humanitarian aid role in Afghanistan, to supporting solutions in Sudan 
and Somalia as well as responding to serious natural disasters. 
 
Europe has been able to play a leading role because its member states remain leading 
international players and are increasingly prepared to instrumentalise the EU and its 
institutions, on the basis of the current legal framework, to pursue their national and 
collective security interests. But is that enough? Should we be satisfied, despite 
widespread academic and governmental criticisms about the lack of coherence in 
CFSP, and conclude that we do not need further institutional reform through the 
treaties?
42 Or further still should we accept the broad framework of the existing 
treaties to push forward on ESDP without reflecting upon the political imperative to 
engage and move forward with the full support of Europe’s citizens? Lastly but 
certainly not least, how can we move forward in this sensitive policy area which is 
widely recognised to suffer from a “double-democratic deficit” at both the national 
and EU levels, and more specifically weak parliamentary scrutiny (and legitimacy)?
43 
This concept of a "double-democratic" deficit refers to the situation whereby the 
                                                 
41 European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners, (2006/2200(INI)), 14 February 2007 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-
0032+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
42 Although related to developments on defence market reform, this argument has been put forward 
recently by: Tybus, M. “With or without the EU Constitutional Treaty: towards a Common Security 
and Defence Policy” in the European Law Review, April 2006, pp. 145-166 
43 Born & Hanggi (eds) "The 'Double-democratic deficit: parliamentary accountability and the use of 
force under international auspicies", Ashgate, 2004. Wessels, W. "The Parliamentary Dimension of 
CFSP/ESDP: Options for the European Convention", Final report, No. IV/2002/01/01, Study submitted 
to the European Parliament. See also Wagner, W." Parliamentary Control of Military Missions: 
Accounting for Pluralism", Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 
Occasional Paper, No. 12, at http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/op12_parliamentarycontrolplural.pdf
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weak formal decision-making powers, but where national parliaments have better 
defined formal powers in relation to their national armed forces but are less well 
placed to follow EU-level developments and decision making in ESDP. These are all 
issues that any responsible citizen, Parliamentarian, Minister and institution should 
reflect upon and which are being debated widely in Europe and in particular in the 
European Parliament.  
 
We can see above that ESDP is developing at a considerable pace without the 
Constitution. This is creating demands on the EU and European Parliament as a 
budgetary authority such as in the need to fund in particular the civilian aspects of 
these missions but also the associated trappings of a greater external profile such as in 
the form of a growing number of Special Representatives. Furthermore, the greater 
perceived role of the EU as a global actor, driven largely by the dynamism of ESDP, 
is also putting pressure on the need for more “joined up” or “coordinated” use of 
policy instruments. The majority of these other policy instruments in the external 
relations area fall under the community (pillar 1) and where the EP now exerts greater 
authority as a co-decision actor.  The net conclusion is that, even in the absence of the 
Constitutional Treaty, as CFSP/ESDP grows the EP is drawn further into the policy 
making framework.  
 
The EP’s decision making powers are founded upon its budgetary role but let us not 
forget even under the current Treaties the European Parliament is a political actor 
responsible for the development of the Union and has a specific mandate to scrutinise 
CFSP. The EP has a responsibility to both its citizens and towards the development of 
CFSP/ESDP. As such it is an important player at the cross-roads where citizens and 
institutions meet in the area of CFSP/ESDP, but is the European Parliament 
sufficiently well informed to scrutinise CFSP and provide democratic legitimacy to 
decisions in this area? If not, is there a risk to the very credibility of the European 
Parliament should an ESDP operation result in deaths or escalate into a more serious 
conflict requiring the further mobilisation of European citizens? The speed of 
development of CFSP/ESDP and the question of parliamentary scrutiny are 
fundamental issues facing the European Union as it progresses under the current 
Treaties or even if the Constitutional Treaty is revitalised.  
 
In response to this growing EU role and action in the area of security policy the 
European Parliament has established in 2004 a new sub-Committee on Security and 
Defence (SEDE) within its Foreign affairs Committee (AFET). With the continued 
rapid growth of ESDP since 2004, the European Parliament is currently considering 
upgrading SEDE into a full Committee on Security and Defence. This would send 
both a strong political signal of the Parliament's intention to pursue this important 
policy area and it would also increase the Parliament's level of scrutiny through more 
regular reports dedicated to ESDP issues.
44  
                                                 
44 On the upgrading of SEDE see European Parliament website article on "Improving the public 
perception and efficiency of the work of the European Parliament - mandate for a working group on 
reform of the Parliament, 15 February 2007 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/008-3202-050-02-08-901-
20070215IPR03201-19-02-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm
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A brief look at key policy journals and expert security studies literature highlights a 
vibrant theoretical debate about the nature of the EU’s external relations and the 
significance of the development of new military crisis management procedures and 
decision making framework represented by ESDP. With the deployment of ESDP 
operations, empirical data is now also emerging and being used to enrich theoretical 
discussions. However, looking at the state-of-the-art of research on EU security and 
defence matters it is obviously still very early in generating empirical analysis to test 
our analytical and theoretical frameworks. This is not a criticism levelled against 
researchers but a consequence of the fact that the first ESDP operations have been 
launched less than five years ago.  
 
Furthermore, the decision-making framework is still in flux as institutional 
innovations come alongside deeper reflections on the future of Europe. It is natural 
therefore that the existing well developed theoretical research is only slowly being 
complimented with empirical data and that this empirical data is first concentrating on 
ESDP policy and (inter-)institutional developments rather than field-oriented 
investigations of operations. In this respect there is, except for some very important 
academic contributions (including dedicated research networks under the European 
Commissions fifth (e.g. ESDP Democracy), sixth (e.g. FORNET, EU CONSENT, and 
CHALLENEGE Liberty and Security) and seventh research framework programmes), 
somewhat of an imbalance between those holding expertise on EU theory and 
integration and those with expertise on EU-oriented security and defence.
45 One 
further expectation from this paper is perhaps to inspire some of you EU experts to 
take a greater interest in EU security and defence in order to ensure the future of 
Europe benefits from the best intellectual minds and rigorous analysis in what is 
perhaps the most important EU policy area of the early twenty-first century.  
 
The academic literature provides us with many perspectives on the development of 
ESDP including the view that we can continue as usual within the framework of the 
existing treaties but also pick-up and implement the innovations in the Constitutional 
Treaty in the area of security and defence (armaments policy, crisis management and 
collective defence). This argument has been put forward forcefully in a recent article 
“With or without the EU Constitutional Treaty: towards a Common Security and 
Defence Policy” in the European Law Review.
46 This view represents a bottom-up or 
technical understanding of the development of ESDP to-date and the limited nature of 
the proposals on defence in the Constitutional Treaty which we have seen can 
continue to be implemented along the trajectory set out in Cologne and Helsinki in 
1999.  
 
However, this argument ignores the political concerns expressed by such people as 
MEP Watson, at the beginning of this article, as well as previous criticisms that have 
long accompanied ESDP and are regaining credence regarding the very premise and 
purpose of EU external action particularly on security and defence matters. We have 
referred to the democratic deficit above, but other concerns are also being highlighted 
                                                 
45 Furthermore see footnotes 41-43 below. More on these research programmes at the respective sites: 
http://www.ulb.ac.be/iee/esdpdemocracy/;  http://www.fornet.info/;  http://www.eu-consent.net/; and   
http://www.libertysecurity.org/
46 Tybus, M. op. cit. 
  20such those that question the ad hoc and piecemeal approach which highlights 
questions of institutional weaknesses and coherence. Another concern has been 
expressed in relation to the institutionalisation of security and defence without a clear 
leadership and direction which in itself lead to fragmentation and incoherence and 
thus undermine the important efforts in recent years to develop a strategic European 
culture on security and defence. The latter need for a strategic culture on security and 
defence was identified by Solana himself in the ESS as the "...need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention”.
47   
 
These concerns seem more urgent in the context of the confusion amongst citizens on 
the exact role and nature of the EU expressed through the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty and in a broader lack of understanding of the complexities of 
EU decision making amongst a wider public – partly fostered deliberately by some 
European leaders. 
4.  Conclusions and Analysis  
The EP itself is still extending its authority over external relations but the complexity, 
lack of transparency and ad hoc nature of ESDP raises many challenges; to 
understand, formulate an opinion and communicate to the public exactly what is 
happening, never-mind be able to predict and offer any reassurances, on future main 
aspects and basic choices of CFSP. If something goes wrong as warned by Watson 
how will the EP explain its role in scrutinising and allowing the budget for such 
(civilian) operations? What does this mean for the institution?  
 
Some aspects of the problem can be addressed within the existing Treaty 
arrangements and are being discussed in particular in the context of the framework of 
                                                 
47 A simple select look at the literature, including that already referenced throughout this article and the 
publications of EU-Institute for Security Studies and ISIS Europe, includes: Smith, M. "Comment: 
Crossroads or cul-de-sac? Reassessing European foreign policy", Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 322–327.  Manners, I. "Normative power Europe reconsidered: 
beyond the crossroads", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 182–199. 
Wolfgang, W. "The democratic control of military power Europe", Journal of European Public Policy, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 200-216. Sjursen, H. "What kind of power?, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 169-181.  Keane, R. "European security and defence 
policy: from cologne to sarajevo", Global Society, Vol. 19, Issue 1, January 2005, pp 89-103.Remacle, 
E. "La stratégie européenne de sécurité. Plus occidentale  qu’européenne", in: Delcourt, Duez and 
Remacle (eds.). "La guerre d’Iraq. Prélude d’un nouvel ordre international?" Bruxelles: pie.   Cornish, 
P. & Edwards, G. "Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture", 
International Affairs Vol. 77 No. 3, 2001, pp. 587–603. Kirchner, Emil J. "The Challenge of European 
Union Security Governance". Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 947-968, 
December 2006, Edwards, G. "Is there a European Security Culture in the Enlarged European Union?", 
International Spectator, Vol. 3, 2006 pp. 7-23.  Smith, K. ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome 
Demise or Cause for. Concern?’. International Spectator, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 11–28. Posen, Barry R. 
"ESDP and the Structure of World Power" The International Spectator No. 1, Rome, 2004. Wallace, 
W. "Is There A European Approach To War?" EFPU Working Paper 2005/2, London School of 
Economics, 2005. Whitman, Richard G. "NATO, the EU and ESDP: an emerging division of labour?" 
Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 25, No. 3, 2004. Bailes Alyson J. K., The European Security 
Strategy: An Evolutionary History. SIPRI Policy Papers No. 10, Stockholm, 2005. Diez, T. 
"Constructing the self and changing others: reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'", Millenium, Vol 
33, No. 3, 2004. Freedman, L. "Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine?", in Charles Grant, 
ed., A European Way of War, Centre for European Reform. Manners, I. "Normative Power Europe: a 
contradiction in terms?", Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2002. 
  21discussions on the implementation of the new external relations instruments and the 
associated Inter-Institutional Agreements. In response to the growing role of the EU, 
in particular through ESDP operations, which is creating a demand for an 
everincreasing CFSP budget, the EP is demanding greater and more timely flow of 
information from the Council in order for it to carry out its responsibilities as a 
budgetary authority. These budgetary decisions also have important consequences of 
a political nature but also for the lives of Europe’s citizens who are, for instance, sent 
on an ESDP Civilian Crisis Management operation to support police or military 
reform in the DRC. The EP therefore demands that it is fully informed before taking 
budgetary decisions that have profound political and material consequences. Not to do 
so risks making uninformed choices that affect the lives of Europe’s citizens and the 
credibility of the European Parliament itself.  
 
Such considerations may have been behind the request of the Member States at the 
Helsinki European Council to request a legal opinion on whether a Treaty amendment 
was necessary in the light of recent developments in ESDP.
48 At the Feira European 
Council an annex makes references to the opinion of the Council Legal Service, 
which provided some reassurance that the existing Treaties provide a framework for 
implementing the Cologne and Helsinki commitments but it also cautioned that "...it 
is for Member States to determine whether amendments to the Treaty would be 
politically desirable or operationally appropriate".
49 Whether addressing the question 
of parliamentary scrutiny as a "politically desirable" or "legally desirable" aspect of 
ESDP, the European Parliament continues to express its concerns on the need to 
adequately respond to its Treaty based rights and responsibilities to provide budgetary 
and political scrutiny over the development of ESDP.  
 
In demanding greater and timely access to information, the EP has recently secured an 
agreement on CFSP from the Finnish Presidency to be informed “before individual 
decision and actions” and to “provide its opinion before such decisions”. This has 
been an important and hard-fought breakthrough for the EP. Such developments are 
important in improving transparency and openness in ESDP decision making which is 
an important step in opening up the “ESDP Black Box” and helping citizens 
understand how decisions are made and where they come from. They might even help 
to improve our understanding of complex interventions where the EU is one of a 
number of actors such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, the DRC and perhaps 
soon Kosovo. It may even help improve our understanding of occasions such as the 
meeting in Brussels on the premises of the Council of the EU where EU member 
states discussed their individual troop contributions to the UN Operation in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL II) and then in the presence of Kofi Annan, Solana and the Presidency 
announced to the world they would contribute but not as the EU !  
 
Further improvements could follow if the Parliament’s (non-binding) opinion was 
referenced in Joint Actions establishing an ESDP mission. Under current practices 
Joint actions normally cite the UNSC Resolution providing authority for a mission, an 
exchange of letters with the country inviting the EU to carry out the operation, and to 
the status of forces agreement/status of mission agreement setting out the legal 
parameters for the role and conduct of the mission in the host country. To reference 
                                                 
48 See above.  
49 Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19 and 20 June 2000,  Presidency 
Report, Annex I on "Strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy".  
  22the opinion of the EP would be a substantial step forward in demonstrating ESDP is 
not above being subjected to prior parliamentary scrutiny at the EU level and seeks 
democratic legitimacy for its external actions. No doubt some will object on the 
grounds that this goes beyond the right of the EP under the existing Treaties and even 
as foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty or that it would slow down already 
cumbersome decision-making procedures. Whether such a proposal would work 
requires a detailed discussion amongst sincere parties willing to explore how to 
improve transparency, openness and parliamentary scrutiny over CFSP. At this stage 
one can only state that the EP’s opinion would be non-binding and therefore fully 
consistent with its current responsibilities in the Treaties and CT, and secondly that 
this non-binding opinion would be complimentary to national Parliamentary practices 
that must also be respected, thirdly, based on examples from national parliaments 
there is no reason why the EP could not achieve the efficiencies of national 
parliaments and be able to provide its opinion within for example 5 days of the launch 
of a Battlegroup.  
 
Indeed, Battlegroups provide a specific challenge whereby the composition of a 
particular Battlegroup will determine if a national parliament or parliaments are 
invited to give their opinion. For instance, German participation in a Battlegroup 
would need both a German government decision in the Council and the approval of 
the Bundestag, whereas a Battlegroup made up of other participating countries may 
not trigger such parliamentary approval. In which case the member states could 
approve a mission on an inter-governmental (i.e. unanimous) basis and if no prior 
parliamentary approval is needed for the specific Battlegroup configuration it would 
be launched with a double-democratic deficit. The European Parliament is faced with 
the scenario of having no budgetary authority over the Battlegroups, which are 
financed directly by the member states, but having to deal with the question of 
political scrutiny over a "European force(s)" which is carrying out a mission in the 
name, and under the flag, of the European Union.  
 
One step forward in this area could be for the European Parliament to be invited to 
scrutinise, and thereby provide legitimacy for, the Battlegroups. In order to do this 
within a short (e.g. five day) timeframe, a European Parliament delegation 
(established by internal procedures) could be sent to the Political and Security 
Committee and would then prepare an opinion to be adopted by the responsible 
(Sub)Committee (AFET/SEDE). There would also need to be an improvement in the 
flow of information to the Parliament in order for it to take such a decision within the 
necessary timeframe. The current flow of information based upon article 21 of the 
Treaty on European Union (where the Parliament is consulted and kept informed on 
the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP) as interpreted by the Council, is 
inadequate for informing the Parliament sufficiently for providing its opinion within a 
short timeframe. The exchange of letters under the Finnish Presidency on improved 
flow of information on the CFSP budget shows that improvements can be agreed. 
However, an opinion to approve the launch of a Battlegroup would require more 
structured/automatic flow of information and should be set out in an Inter-Institutional 
Agreement. This would provide the European Parliament with the necessary 
information from, and consultation with, the Political and Security Committee for its 
(Sub)Committee to prepare its opinion on the launch of a Battlegroup and thereby 
providing both parliamentary scrutiny and legitimacy for the operation. Should the 
European Parliament express an opinion that is not in favour of an operation, the 
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Council would not be bound by its findings and the European Union would benefit 
from a transparent and public debate. The risk is a marginal one, particularly when 
compared with the potential gains of a more visible, transparent, and democratically 
accountable ESDP emerging from the shadow of the constitution.  
 
 Annex I:  ESDP/EU military and civilian crisis management, stabilisation and monitoring missions/operations- 
Financial framework
50
 
 
 
 
 
    the use of financial sources and mechanisms: 
 
EU operations  Type of 
mission 
Duration of 
the 
operation
51
(costs
52 (as 
of 01/2007) 
Link to Legal 
Basis 
EU Budget 
(CFSP 
budget line) 
EU Budget 
under the 
Commission 
competence 
Ad-hoc 
mechanism 
for military 
operations 
financing 
Athena 
Mechanism 
European 
Development 
Fund (Africa 
Peace 
Facility) 
1 
EU Military 
Operation in 
former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
(fYROM/Concor
dia) 
military  03/2003-
12/2003 
4.7 million 
(2003) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/
Result.do?arg
0=European+
Union+military
+operation+in
+the+Former+
Yugoslav+Rep
ublic+of+Mace
donia&arg1=&
arg2=&titre=titr
e&chlang=en&
RechType=RE
CH_mot&Sub
mit=Search
NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
                                                 
50 Source Malovec, M., Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), European Parliament, 11 May 2007  
51 Starting with the entry into force of the respective legislation. 
52 Costs involve the financial reference amount provided by the legal decisions launching the operations (Joint Actions); and where applicable, the financing of EUSR, other 
Community support to the operation, the European Development Fund or other relevant expenditure (e.g. MS/ 3rd countries´bilateral contributions) as known to the author of 
this paper from the relevant accessible sources at the beginning of January 2006.  
  25 2 
EU Military 
Operation in 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
(DRC/Artemis) 
military  06/2003-
09/2003 
7 million 
(2003) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
uropean+Union
+military+opera
tion+in+the+De
mocratic+Repu
blic+of+Congo
&arg1=&arg2=
&titre=titre&chl
ang=en&RechT
ype=RECH_mo
t&Submit=Sear
ch
NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
3 
EU Rule of Law 
Mission in 
Georgia (Eujust 
Themis) 
civilian (rule 
of law) 
07/2004-
07/2005 
2.307.873  
(2004-2005) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=e
ujust+themis&a
rg1=&arg2=&ti
tre=titre&chlan
g=en&RechTyp
e=RECH_mot&
Submit=Search  
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
4 
EU Military 
Operation in 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
(EUFOR-Althea) 
military  12/2004-  71.7 million 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/
Result.do?arg
0=althea&arg1
=&arg2=&titre
=titre&chlang=
en&RechType
=RECH_mot&
Submit=Searc
h
NO  NO  NO  YES  NO 
  265 
civilian 
(police 
mission) 
10/2003-
12/2005 
37.511 millio
n  
(all from 
CFSP 
budget, 
2003: 7.3  
million  
+ 0.65 million
; 
2004: 7.056 
million + 
6.555 million 
+ 5 million; 
2005:10.95 
million) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
UPol+proxima
&arg1=&arg2=
&titre=titre&chl
ang=en&RechT
ype=RECH_mo
t&Submit=Sear
ch
 
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
European Union 
Police Mission 
in the former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
(Proxima) 
EU Police 
Mission in 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(EUPM) 
civilian 
(police 
mission) 
6 
04/2002-
12/2007 
(possible 
extension) 
153.850.000 
 
(2002:14 
million - 
CFSP 
budget; 
2003: 1.7 mill
ion (CFSP 
budget + 38 
million (of 
which 
16.69 million 
 from CFSP; 
2004: 38 
million of 
which 
17.5 million fr
om CFSP 
budget; 
2005: 38 
million of 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
UPM&arg1=&a
rg2=&titre=titre
&chlang=en&R
echType=REC
H_mot&Submit
=Search
 
 
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 07)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
  27which 17.41 
million from 
CFSP budget 
+ 3 million  
CFSP 
budget; 
2006: 9 
million CFSP 
budget; 
11/2006-
12/2007: 
12.150.000) 
7 
European Union 
Police Mission 
in Kinshasa 
(DRC) (EUPOL 
"Kinshasa") 
civilian 
(police 
mission) 
12/2004-
30/06/2007 
(to be 
extended) 
9,945 million 
(12/2004-
04/2006: 4.37 
million; 
05/2006-
12/2006: 3.5 
million ; 
01/2007-
06/2007: 
2.075 million) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=e
upol+kinshasa&
arg1=&arg2=&t
itre=titre&chlan
g=en&RechTyp
e=RECH_mot&
Submit=Search
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 07)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
7b 
European Union 
support to the 
establishment of 
the Integrated 
Police Unit in the 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) 
  2004- 
585000 
+ in-kind 
and financial 
MS 
contribution
s (in 
addition to 
other EDF 
project to 
support IPU) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/L
exUriServ/site/e
n/oj/2004/l_182
/l_18220040519
en00410045.pdf 
YES  NO  NO  NO  NO 
  28EU Integrated 
Rule of Law 
Mission for Iraq 
(Eujust Lex) 
civilian 
(police, rule 
of law 
mission) 
03/2005-
06/2006 
(possible 
extension) 
21,2 million 
(03/2006-
10/2006: 10 
million
53 of 
which 
services in 
Baghdad up 
to 2.5 million; 
11/2006-
12/2007: 11.2 
million CFSP 
Budget) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=e
ujust+lex&arg1
=&arg2=&titre
=titre&chlang=
en&RechType=
RECH_mot&Su
bmit=Search
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO  8 
EU mission to 
provide advice 
and assistance 
for security 
sector reform in 
the 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) 
 (EUSEC DR 
Congo) 
civilian  
05/2005-
30/06/2007 
(to be 
extended) 
8.19 million 
(2005: 1.6 
million-CFSP 
budget;  
until 
15/02/2006: 
0.9 million - 
MS 
contributions, 
16/02/2006 - 
02/05/2006: 
0.94 million 
CFSP 
03/05/2006 - 
30/06/2007: 
4.75 
million)
54
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=t
he+European+
Union+mission
+to+provide+ad
vice+and+assist
ance+for+securi
ty+sector+refor
m+in+the+Dem
ocratic+Republi
c+of+the+Cong
o&arg1=&arg2
=&titre=titre&c
hlang=en&Rech
Type=RECH_m
ot&Submit=Sea
rch
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO  9 
                                                 
53 An amount of 10 million EUR was decided for the whole mission. 
54 the overall contribution for 2007 foreseen is 10 million; source http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09141.en07.pdf 
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European Union 
civilian-military 
supporting 
action to the 
African Union 
missions in the 
Darfur region of 
Sudan and in 
Somalia 
(AMIS/AMISOM 
EU Supporting 
Action) 
civilian-
military 
supporting 
action 
AMIS
55 
support: 
07/2005-
10/2007 
(possibly 
longer) 
 
AMISOM 
support: 
04/2007-
onwards 
341.875 
 
(07/2005-
12/2005: 2.12 
million- 
AMIS EU 
Supporting 
Action from 
CFSP 
budget; 
1.97 million 
from 
ATHENA; 
01/2006-
10/2006:2.2 
million
56
+ 1.275 
million 
(EUSR -  
2005: 0.675 
million; 
2006: 0.6 
million) 
+92 million 
from African 
Peace 
Facility 
+196.4 
million 
(MS bilateral 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
uropean+Union
+civilian-
military+suppor
ting+action+to+
the+African+U
nion+mission+i
n+the+Darfur+r
egion+of+Suda
n&arg1=&arg2
=&titre=titre&c
hlang=en&Rech
Type=RECH_m
ot&Submit=Sea
rch  
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03; 
19 03 06) 
NO  NO  YES  YES 
                                                 
55 According to the Commission, in total, the EU and the Member States have contributed over € 570 million towards alleviating and resolving the Darfur conflict., source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/africa/african_peacekeepers/index_en.htm 
 
56 The amount of 2,2 million EUR is intended for the period 01/2006  - 07//2006. 
  30asssistance 
+11/2006-
onwards: 
1.785 million 
CFSP 
budget) + 15 
million (EDF 
for AMISOM);
05/2007-
10/2007 
(AMIS 
supporting 
action): 2.125 
million 
11 
EU Monitoring 
Mission in Aceh 
(AMM) 
civilian 
(monitoring) 
09/2005-
12/2006 
16.83 million 
 
(2005: 9 
million;  
2006: 
300.000+1.5
3 million  
+ 6 million 
special 
contributions 
from MS/3rd 
countries) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=
AMM&arg1=&
arg2=&titre=titr
e&chlang=en&
RechType=RE
CH_mot&Subm
it=Search
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 03)
NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
12 
EU Coordinating 
Office for 
Palestinian 
Police Support 
(EUCOPPS) 
civilian 
(police 
mission) 
11/2005-
12/2008 
8.900.000  
 
(2005: 2.5 
million; 
2006: 3.6 
million;  
2007: 2,8 
million; 
for 2008 will 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
uropean+Union
+Police+Missio
n+for+the+Pale
stinian+Territor
ies&arg1=&arg
2=&titre=titre&
YES 
(19 03 07)  NO  N/A  N/A  NO 
  31be decided 
later) 
chlang=en&Rec
hType=RECH_
mot&Submit=S
earch
  
13 
EU Border 
Assistance 
Mission for the 
Rafah Crossing 
Point (EU BAM 
Rafah) 
civilian 
(police, 
administratio
n mission) 
12/2005-
05/2007 (to 
be extended) 
total: 
7.600.000  
 
(2005: 
1.696.659 ; 
01/2006-
05/2007: 
5.903.341 )
57
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
U+BAM+Rafah
&arg1=&arg2=
&titre=titre&chl
ang=en&RechT
ype=RECH_mo
t&idRoot=1&S
ubmit=Search  
YES 
(19 03 01)  NO
58 N/A  N/A  NO 
EU Police 
Advisory Team 
in the Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
(EUPAT) 
civilian 
(police 
advisory 
mission) 
11/2005-
06/2006 
1.5 million 
(2006) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
UPAT&arg1=&
arg2=&titre=titr
e&chlang=en&
RechType=RE
CH_mot&Subm
it=Search
 
YES  NO  N/A  N/A  NO  14 
                                                 
57 The possible overall financing foreseen in 2007 might reach 7,3 million.;source: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09141.en07.pdf 
58 For flanking measures only. 
  3215 
EU Border 
Assistance 
Mission to 
Moldova and 
Ukraine 
not an ESDP 
mission; 
financed from 
EC 
expenditure 
and via 
support of an 
EUSR 
11/2005-
11/2007 
8 million 
(2005: 4 
million from 
the Rapid 
Reaction 
Mechanism 
+0.3 million  
(2005: 
EUSR) 
 
YES 
(budgetary 
line 19 03 06)
YES 
(2005: 
Rapid 
Reaction 
Mechanism)
N/A  N/A  NO 
EU MM in 
Western 
Balkans  
not an ESDP 
mission 
(monitoring) 
01/2001-
12/2007  
17.841.386,8 
(2000-2001: 
4.820.404; 
2002: 6 979 
000 ; 
2005: 2 
million ; 
2006: 
1.723.982,80 
2007:2 318 
000) 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
UMM&arg1=&
arg2=&titre=titr
e&chlang=en&
RechType=RE
CH_mot&Subm
it=Search
 
 
YES  
(budgetary 
line 19 03 01)
NO  N/A  N/A  N/A  16 
 
 
 
 
    17 
EU planning 
team regarding 
a possible EU 
crisis 
management 
operation in the 
field of rule of 
law and 
possible other 
areas in Kosovo 
 (EUPT Kosovo) 
EU planning 
team 
regarding a 
possible 
future EU 
civilian crisis 
management 
operation in 
the field of 
rule of law 
and police 
 
core 
deployment 
since 
01/04/2006 
full 
deployment 
since 
01/09/2006 - 
05/2007 (to 
be extended 
soon) 
13.550 million 
 
04/2006-
12/2006: 
3.005 million; 
01/2007-
05/2007: 
10.545 
million (CFSP 
budget)
59
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=E
UPT&arg1=&ar
g2=&titre=titre
&chlang=en&R
echType=REC
H_mot&Submit
=Search
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
(19 03 03) 
 
 
 
 
     NO 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
                                                 
59 The overall expected costs in 2007: 43.955.000; source: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09141.en07.pdf
  3318  EU-team to 
contribute to the 
preparations of 
the 
establishment 
of a possible 
international 
civilian mission 
in Kosovo, 
including a 
European Union 
Special 
Representative 
component 
(ICM/EUSR 
Preparation 
Team) 
 
preparation 
for 
ICM/EUSR 
15/09/2006-
31/07/2007 
1.676.000 
 
09/2006-
03/2007: 869 
000; 
09/2006-
07/2007: 807 
000 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/R
esult.do?arg0=I
CM%2FEUSR+
Preparation+Te
am&arg1=&arg
2=&titre=titre&
chlang=en&Rec
hType=RECH_
mot&Submit=S
earch
 
         
 
 
19 
EU military 
operation in 
support of the 
United Nations 
Organisation 
Mission in the 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC) 
during the 
election process 
(EUFOR DR 
Congo) 
 
 
military 
30/07/2006-
30/11/2006 
(+time for 
deployment 
and 
redeployment 
not included) 
16,7 million 
(Athena) 
+ approx. 56 
milllion 
(German 
contribution) 
+ approx. 56 
million 
(French 
contribution) 
+ other 
national 
expenditure 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Re
sult.do?arg0=euf
or+&arg1=&arg
2=&titre=titre&c
hlang=en&Rech
Type=RECH_m
ot&Submit=Sear
ch
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
NO 
  3420  Kosovo Rule of 
Law and Police 
ESDP Mission 
civilian        YES  
(19 03 03) 
       
21  Afghanistan 
Police Mission: 
EUPOL 
Afghanistan 
civilian    foressen 
expenditure: 
58.000.000
60
  YES 
(19 03 07) 
       
22  ESDP Security 
Sector Reform 
police mission 
to the 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo (EUPOL 
RD Congo) 
civilian                 
 
                                                 
60 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st09/st09141.en07.pdf
 
  35 
  36